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The past three decades have witnessed the rapid globalization of stock, 
bond, and currency markets, which has been facilitated by advances in 
telecommunications and the liberalization of previously sheltered, and often 
repressed, domestic capital markets. The process has been spurred by the search 
for higher yields and undervalued assets, wherever they may be located, on the 
part of individual and institutional investors; and also by the desire to mitigate 
asset-concentration risks via diversified, uncorrelated portfolios. This 
globalization has also been accelerated by the mushrooming of trade linkages 
and the spread of multinational corporations, which have put pressure on banks 
and other intermediaries to deliver all kinds of financial services—from old-
fashioned trade credits to currency swaps and asset-backed finance—everywhere 
and around the clock. 
The birth of globalized capital markets has been painful, pockmarked by 
periodic crises spanning at times a multitude of countries: the industrialized 
nations in the 1970s, Latin America in the 1980s, and Asia in the 1990s. 
Governments have usually planted the seeds of those crises: first, by holding 
onto artificial exchange rate regimes even as their ability to control foreign 
exchange flows was fast diminishing; and second, by failing to set prudent limits 
on their own foreign indebtedness and on the mismatching of liabilities by their 
banks, even as the opportunities for financial mischief multiplied.
1  
Financial historians will recall Argentina in the 1990s as an extreme case: a 
country that pretended for a decade that its historically weak currency (the peso) 
could be as strong and stable as the US currency, at a fixed one-to-one exchange 
rate set by government fiat. To make matters worse, the authorities there literally 
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“bet the ranch” by borrowing almost exclusively in dollars and other foreign 
currencies to finance a string of budgetary deficits, even though their revenues 
were due and collected only in pesos.
2   Once an erosion of export 
competitiveness, aggravated by fiscal and political indiscipline, undermined the 
regime’s credibility and led to a run on available dollars, bank deposits were 
frozen, capital controls were imposed, and soon after the peso had to be sharply 
devalued. A sinking currency rendered the government instantly insolvent: the 
net public debt, which at the one peso per dollar exchange rate was equivalent to 
nearly three times annual tax revenues and 50 percent of GDP, virtually tripled 
once the currency sank to around three pesos per dollar, becoming unaffordable 
to service.  
I. DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON SOVEREIGN  
FINANCIAL CRISES 
Most academic economists, legal scholars, and policy gurus have focused 
their attention upon the alleged inefficiencies in international financial markets 
that supposedly lead to these periodic crises and complicate their resolution.
3 
They have argued that globalization has spawned increasingly diverse, diffuse, 
and unmanageable creditor and debtor communities that pose coordination and 
collective action problems. Gone are the days when a relatively small syndicate 
of commercial banks could gather quickly in New York or London, spurred into 
action by urgent telephone calls from their supervisory authorities, to deal with 
whatever financial emergency had erupted in some distant corner of the world. 
Nowadays, everything can be and is securitized and distributed widely around 
the globe, such that a financial “hiccup” in some corner of the world can affect a 
huge constituency half a world away—everyone from naïve retail investors to 
savvy hedge funds. As a result, governments that lose the confidence of their 
bank depositors, bondholders, or bank creditors, or fall victim to regional 
“contagion” effects, are claimed to be unable to work out constructive solutions 
prior to a major currency, banking, or debt crisis. 
After a crisis erupts, it is said, financial stability can only be restored by 
obtaining a massive package of loans from the G-7 governments acting through 
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the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)—the now classic “bailout.” And 
when sovereign liabilities need to be restructured or written down, the story 
goes, the absence of an orderly sovereign bankruptcy mechanism means 
workouts are delayed and their effectiveness is undermined by “free riders” and 
“rogue” (holdout) creditors. As Anne Krueger, the IMF’s second-highest-
ranking official, expressed it in amazingly hypothetical fashion:  
[I]n the current environment, it may be particularly difficult to secure high 
participation from creditors as a group, as individual creditors may consider 
that their best interests would be served by trying to free ride . . . . These 
difficulties  may be amplified by the prevalence of complex financial 
instruments . . . which in some cases may provide investors with incentives 
to hold out . . . rather than participating in a restructuring.4 
This focus upon the alleged shortcomings of financial globalization, and 
the seeming repetition of currency and debt crises, spawned various concrete 
proposals earlier this decade to reform the “international financial architecture.”
5 
The so-called statutory approach argued for the creation of a supranational 
bankruptcy authority that would adjudicate financial claims on troubled 
sovereigns in an expeditious manner, overriding contracts written in national 
jurisdictions. The “contractual approach” called for the modification of 
boilerplate bond clauses (especially under New York law) in ways that would 
facilitate communication among creditors and with the sovereign debtor, restrain 
disruptive litigation, and facilitate restructuring decisions by a qualified majority 
rather than unanimous consent. 
Initially, consideration of both approaches was urged by several academic 
scribblers and favored by the G-7 governments; it was generally resisted by the 
financial industry and by many sovereign issuers in the emerging markets. In the 
end, however, the US Treasury sided with the contractual approach and 
persuaded the government of Mexico and its bankers to issue a bond, in early 
2003, subject to New York law but incorporating innovative “collective action 
clauses.” The transaction was successful because investors did not demand a 
premium for the contractual innovation, and ever since, a growing number of 
sovereign bond issues have incorporated the said clauses at no obvious 
additional cost.
6 The impetus to continue to reform the rules and practices of 
international finance has subsequently died down, especially since there has not 
been a major crisis in the past couple of years. 
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Economists and lawyers working in the financial industry (on behalf of 
investors, issuers, and intermediaries) have looked mostly askance at this 
literature coming out of the universities and the G-7 policy gurus.
7 After all, the 
international capital markets are exceedingly transparent and competitive when 
compared with most other markets for goods and services. What may look like 
inefficiencies viewed from the ivory tower are regarded as short-lived, arbitrage 
opportunities when viewed from the trading floor. Moreover, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the absence of a supranational bankruptcy procedure, or 
the dearth of contracts with collective action clauses, have impeded or even 
delayed sovereign debt workouts. Governments that have sought massive 
emergency financial aid from the IMF and the G-7 have probably done so not 
because they were unable to work things out cooperatively with their creditors, 
but because they did not want to face them. They would rather engage in what 
the economics literature has termed “gambling for [financial] resurrection.” 
Indeed, experience demonstrates that neither the threat nor the act of 
litigation, nor isolated instances of “rogue creditor” behavior, have thwarted the 
debt restructurings that needed to be accomplished. The governments of 
Ecuador, Moldova, Pakistan, Russia, the Ukraine, and Uruguay have all been 
able to restructure their bonded debt in recent years, despite the fact that their 
investor base was quite diverse and scattered and the debts in question were 
denominated in different currencies and were bound by contracts from several 
jurisdictions. With the exception of the Russia debt restructuring, which took 
more than a year, these transactions were completed quite smoothly within a 
matter of months, and creditor holdouts were not a significant problem. Three 
of these restructurings were even concluded prior to an event of default 
(Moldova, Pakistan, and Uruguay), and three others only afterwards (Ecuador, 
Russia, and Ukraine)—although not because of a lack of creditor cooperation. 
Three entailed the extension of maturities without any meaningful reduction in 
coupons (Moldova, Pakistan, and Uruguay); another involved the lengthening of 
maturities and cutting of interest payments (Ukraine); and the remaining two 
incorporated principal forgiveness plus debt service concessions (Ecuador and 
Russia). In earlier years, the bonded debt of Costa Rica (1985), Guatemala 
(1989), and Panama (1994) had likewise been successfully restructured. After 
examining the actual evidence, two international finance experts who are not on 
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Wall Street’s payroll recently concluded: “Clearly, bond restructurings are 
possible in a wide range of circumstances.”
8 
It turns out that it is the official creditor community, represented by the 
Paris Club of foreign aid and export credit agencies, and the multilateral 
organizations (the IMF, the World Bank, and the regional development banks), 
which has been far less responsive to the needs of governments with solvency 
problems.
9 The G-7 governments that have pointed an accusing finger in the 
direction of the private capital markets are the same ones that have dragged their 
feet again and again in terms of granting permanent debt relief even after the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative came into effect precisely for 
such purpose.
10 The principle of “comparable treatment,” under which the Paris 
Club has often forced private creditors to grant debt relief, does not operate in 
reverse, as became clear during the Brady Plan era in the early 1990s, and again 
after the Ecuador and Russia workouts in the late 1990s.
11 In sum, while bankers 
and bondholders have resolved expeditiously and even generously the sovereign 
debt crises in which they have been involved in various parts of the world, 
especially in recent years, the official development community cannot make the 
same claim. 
The prevailing view in the private capital markets is that, if anything, 
reforms should be aimed at facilitating the enforcement of claims against 
sovereigns, as well as the early and constructive involvement of private-sector 
creditors in addressing sovereign liquidity or solvency problems.
12 After  all, 
despite the strong rights that creditors have on paper under New York, English, 
or other law, practical experience has long suggested that the enforcement of 
claims against sovereigns is a very difficult and protracted affair. Despite the 
usual surrender of sovereign immunity in standard loan and bond 
documentation, governments cannot, in fact, be compelled to deal with their 
underlying problems by changing management, restructuring operations, or 
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12   See Institute of International Finance, Principles for Private Sector Involvement in Crisis Prevention and 
Resolution 4–5 (2001), available online at <http://www.iif.com/press/pdf/psi0101.pdf> (visited 
Mar 26, 2005) (discussing the importance of consultations with key investors and lenders). Chicago Journal of International Law 
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mobilizing resources; moreover, their hard-currency assets cannot in practice be 
attached. 
II. ENTER THE ROGUE DEBTOR: ARGENTINA 
The vast literature on the alleged defects of the international financial 
architecture does not dwell upon the possibility that one or more sovereign 
debtors will take purposeful advantage of their de facto immunity to walk away 
from legal and financial obligations. In contrast to all the hand-wringing about 
the potential dangers posed by “rogue creditors,” nary a drop of ink has been 
spent discussing the risk to the integrity and efficiency of international capital 
markets posed by “rogue debtors.” And yet, the world has definitely seen its 
share of deadbeats. Even preferred creditors such as the IMF and the World 
Bank have long had to provision against some sovereign nonperformers, and 
their write-off experience would be much heavier if it were not for the prospect 
of debt forgiveness dangled by the aforementioned HIPC initiative, which has 
encouraged many borderline-bankrupt governments to remain current.
13 
As concerns private creditors, their most meaningful encounter with a 
rogue debtor—before Argentina came along, that is—was Peru in the 1980s. 
The authorities there began to run arrears to banks and suppliers in 1984, but 
after President Alan García was inaugurated a year later, the running of payment 
arrears became an officially sanctioned policy. Negotiations with creditors were 
shunned, debt-service payments were capped at a certain level set in relation to 
export earnings, and the default soon widened to encompass obligations due to 
the multilateral agencies, including the IMF. Many of Peru’s commercial lenders 
pursued claims in New York and other jurisdictions, but they were not able to 
attach assets and collect on outstanding debts. It took many years and a new and 
very different government (under President Alberto Fujimori) for Peru to 
regularize its financial situation. In late 1991, the government paid off its arrears 
to the multilateral agencies (mainly thanks to bridge loans from friendly 
governments including the US), but it would take until 1997 for the country to 
complete a debt reduction and restructuring process (under the aegis of the 
Brady Plan) and become current with all private creditors. It was only in 2000 
that a lone “rogue” creditor (Elliott Associates) was able to obtain full payment 
on a small amount of unrestructured obligations, on the basis of a New York 
ruling enforced in a somewhat unconventional way by a Brussels court, by 
threatening to attach payments to other creditors made through Euroclear.
14 
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This brings us to the case of Argentina, by far the largest and potentially 
most complex default the world has ever known. It was declared unilaterally by 
an interim government to the cheers of legislators in the final days of December 
2001. A unilateral restructuring offer was presented to bondholders three years 
later (January 2005), which was accepted by 76 percent of total bondholders. A 
settlement with the remaining bondholders, and with other creditors, including 
bilateral agencies represented by the Paris Club, will probably take several more 
years to achieve. 
The extent of the default first began to be revealed in February 2002, when 
the government (then led by President Eduardo Duhalde) issued a decree that 
was refined in four subsequent resolutions. Those rulings made it clear that the 
government would continue to service more than half of the total public debt, 
excluding arrears: loans from multilateral official lenders; bonds held by 
creditors who agreed to have their obligations redenominated in pesos; and 
holders of new bonds issued since the default, mainly to banks and their 
depositors, as well as to those who had financial claims on provincial 
governments now taken over by the central government. By residual, the debts 
that would eventually be subject to a restructuring were all remaining bonds (152 
of them, denominated in six currencies and subject to eight legal jurisdictions); 
debts to official bilateral agencies, including but not limited to the Paris Club; 
and loans from commercial banks and suppliers. At the time, the principal 
entangled in the default exceeded $60 billion, but it would grow to around $105 
billion by the end of 2004, including some $14 billion of past-due interest (at 
contractual rates) that for the most part the government would refuse to 
recognize. 
The government made one major executive decision that reduced the value 
of its debt obligations and two others that increased it, the net result of which 
was to augment the size of the performing debt to the detriment of its capacity 
to honor the nonperforming debt. The first decision decreed the forcible 
conversion of all government debt subject to Argentine law from foreign 
currencies into pesos at an exchange rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar—this at a time 
when the currency was free-falling toward two pesos per dollar, and several 
weeks before it touched bottom at four pesos, before finally settling at around 
three pesos per dollar. This measure minimized the impact of currency 
devaluation upon a portion of the stock of public debt, but obviously at the cost 
of disadvantaging the bondholders, who were mostly domestic pension and 
mutual funds, and insurance companies and banks, which had purposely hedged Chicago Journal of International Law 
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themselves by investing in dollar-denominated securities.
15   Many of these 
investors then commenced litigation in Argentina against the government, so far 
without success. 
The second decision pertained to the assets and liabilities of the banking 
system denominated in dollars, which constituted the bulk of their balance 
sheets. Dollar loans to the private sector were forcibly converted into pesos at a 
one-for-one exchange rate, whereas dollar deposits in banks were to be 
recognized at 1.4 pesos per dollar. The former move was intended to fully 
protect households and companies with dollar debts from the currency’s 
devaluation, and the latter to limit the windfall that would have accrued to bank 
customers who had (by that time effectively frozen) dollar-denominated 
deposits. Understandably, this government decision was very popular among 
debtors but proved very unpopular among depositors, who staged loud protests 
and proceeded to jam the courts with lawsuits against the banks and the 
government. Thousands of these suits have resulted in lower court and appeals 
court decisions favorable to individual depositors, who have subsequently 
obtained restitution from their banks. The banks, however, have not obtained 
restitution from the government. 
By introducing a costly exchange-rate mismatch into the balance sheets of 
banks, however, this government decision—so-called asymmetric pesification—
effectively rendered the banking system insolvent. Banks subsequently had to be 
recapitalized via the large-scale issuance of government bonds provided to them 
in compensation, thereby increasing the level of post-default public debt. A 
hefty amount of government bonds was also issued to compensate depositors 
for the freezing and subsequent rescheduling of their deposits, although at least 
these bonds generated an offsetting contingent asset for the government, 
because banks were obligated to gradually reimburse the government in lieu of 
meeting customer withdrawals. 
The third decision involved the central government’s takeover of liabilities 
incurred (including currencies issued) by provincial governments in prior years 
as part of a fiscal cleanup and consolidation process. This too led to a substantial 
post-default increase in the public debt, and likewise to an offsetting asset, 
because the provinces agreed to reimburse the central government over time. In 
a related move, government bonds were also issued in 2002–03 to settle 
previously contingent liabilities with pensioners, civil servants, victims of human 
rights abuses, and the like. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Argentina’s public debt during 2002–03 
($ billions) 
As of 31 Dec 2001  144.45 
  
Forced debt conversion to pesos  -22.09 
Bonds issued to banks  8.30 
Bonds issued to bank depositors   6.09 
Bonds issued on behalf of provinces  12.11 
Inflation adjustment of new bonds  7.33 
Other assorted bonds issued        2.51 
Subtotal 14.24 
  
Interest arrears on defaulted debt  13.94 
Other transactions  6.19 
  
As of 31 Dec 2003  178.82 
Source: Ministry of Economy of Argentina   
 
The end result of these government decisions was that the stock of 
performing public debt, which could have fallen by $22.1 billion during 2002–03 
in the wake of the forced currency redenomination, ended up being increased by 
$14.2 billion—a $36.3 billion difference equivalent to about half of the 
postdefault performing public debt, and to a whopping 31 percent of the 2002–
03 average GDP. In partial compensation, the government would accumulate 
$11 billion in financial assets by the end of 2003, derived from claims on banks 
and provincial governments on whose behalf the new debt had been issued. The 
banks and provincial governments are reimbursing the central government for 
these liabilities, and the provincial obligations are secured by a pledge of tax 
revenues that the provinces receive from the central government as part of the 
existing revenue-sharing scheme. The government’s financial assets would reach 
$21 billion by late 2004, and come to include more than $6 billion in cash (in 
foreign currencies) held by the National Treasury. However, the authorities 
would never offer to mobilize these assets, via their liquidation or securitization, 
for the purpose of improving the treatment of defaulted debt.  
In the aftermath of the devaluation and default, the authorities also made 
an important decision that would greatly enhance the government’s ability to 
service debt obligations. They imposed taxes upon exports, justifying them 
because exporters would otherwise reap too large of a windfall from the 
currency’s sharp devaluation—even though exporters had suffered financially 
throughout the 1990s, during the country’s hard-peso policy. The standard tax Chicago Journal of International Law 
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for most products has ranged from 5 percent to 20 percent of FOB export 
values, with a supplement of 3–5 percent for certain commodities. These taxes 
on exports ended up yielding much more than initially envisioned because 
export earnings in dollar terms increased 15 percent in 2003 and an additional 16 
percent in 2004, spearheaded by higher prices for fuel and soybean exports. 
Export earnings in 2004 reached a record of $34.5 billion, up from $26.6 billion 
in 2001, a 30 percent gain that translated into a 380 percent taxable increase in 
peso terms. Taxes on exports, which yielded a mere 50 million pesos in 2001 
(equivalent to $0.05 billion), consequently generated more than 10 billion pesos 
by 2004 ($3.5 billion). 
The quantum increase in tax revenues from exports has been accompanied 
by a generalized recovery of tax collections in the wake of the economy’s strong 
upturn, with real GDP growth of 8.8 percent in 2003, and another 9.0 percent in 
2004, following a cumulative GDP decline of 18.4 percent during 1999–2002. 
Indeed, tax revenues in 2004 were more than double their 2001 level, measured 
in pesos, although they were still more than one-fourth lower when translated 
into dollars at the managed exchange rate of 2.94 pesos per dollar on average for 
2004. Indeed, the authorities have been keeping the peso purposely undervalued 
during the past couple of years to encourage the influx of dollars via a sizable 
foreign trade surplus. They have ensured its artificial weakness by purchasing 
excess dollars from the foreign exchange market through daily interventions, and 
to such an extent that official international reserves rose to $20 billion by the 
end of 2004, a near doubling from their 2002 year end level ($10.5 billion). Had 
the central bank allowed the exchange rate to be set by market forces, the 
Argentine currency would probably have traded closer to 2.50 pesos per dollar 
during 2004. Therefore, a less artificial currency regime would have allowed for 
swollen tax revenues in pesos to be worth almost 85 percent of their predefault 
levels, once translated into dollars at a realistic exchange rate. From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s Default  Porzecanski 
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Note: “rhs” stands for right-hand scale. 
* At the likely market exchange rate of 2.50, rather than the managed average 
exchange rate of 2.94 pesos per dollar. 
Source: Ministry of Economy of Argentina, author’s calculations. 
 
The very strong performance of Argentine tax revenues since the default 
means that the government’s ability to meet its obligations to bondholders and 
other creditors, which had been so seriously compromised by the peso’s 
devaluation, has been substantially restored. At the end of 2001, the public debt 
net of financial assets stood at $135 billion, and this was equivalent to about 270 
percent of total revenues and 50 percent of GDP. One year later, it had declined 
to $130 billion, but because of the devaluation’s impact upon peso-based 
revenues and GDP, the net public debt had now surged to the equivalent of 
nearly 725 percent of revenues and 130 percent of GDP. By the end of 2004, 
however, even though the net debt had increased to $168 billion as a result of 
the aforementioned decisions made by the government, the debt was now 
equivalent to around 400 percent of revenues and less than 100 percent of GDP 
(at the likely market exchange rate), with official and private forecasts pointing 
to still lower ratios in 2005. If the government had not issued all the new debt 
that it did after the default, the net debt-to-revenues ratio at the end of 2004 
would already have dropped below 350 percent, and the net debt-to-GDP ratio 
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* Including interest arrears at contracted rates. 
** At the likely market exchange rate of 2.50, rather than the managed average 
exchange rate of 2.94 pesos per dollar. 
Source: Ministry of Economy of Argentina, author’s calculations. 
 
These are very high but not necessarily unmanageable ratios, depending 
upon the maturity structure and interest burden of the debt. For example, 
countries ranging from Egypt and Israel to India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, all 
have ratios of net public debt to revenues of around 200–450 percent, and ratios 
of net debt to GDP within the range of 80–95 percent. Moreover, one of 
Argentina’s neighbors, Uruguay, faced a similar degree of over-indebtedness in 
2002–03, following a ruinous recession and currency devaluation—plus a 
massive run on its banks—and yet it refused to dishonor its obligations to 
creditors. After holding informal consultations with many of its bondholders in 
early 2003, the government of Uruguay put forth a debt exchange solely for the 
purpose of extending maturities, which was agreed upon by more than 90 
percent of bondholders. In the wake of a strong recovery of government 
revenues and real GDP, Uruguay’s net public debt has since dropped to the 
equivalent of 80 percent of GDP and 300 percent of revenues.
16 
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The Argentine government’s overall approach to its default has been 
uncooperative, to say the least. While other sovereigns in financial trouble, 
including Argentina itself in the past, have actively sought to avoid an event of 
default or have acted promptly to cure any default, in this case the government 
has dragged its feet for more than three years and, adding insult to injury, has 
largely refused to recognize the interest arrears that its own delay generated. 
Traditionally, sovereigns needing debt relief have followed one of two 
paths. The first is the negotiated route, whereby governments sit down to 
hammer out a debt-restructuring deal with a representative committee of either 
bondholders or commercial bankers, depending upon which group holds a 
majority of the claims on the sovereign. This is the typical approach followed by 
dozens of governments in recent decades, from Argentina in the early 1980s to 
Vietnam in the late 1990s. They all negotiated with a Bank Advisory Committee 
(“BAC”) or so-called London Club (because most of the negotiating sessions 
took place either in London or in New York), in contrast to the so-called Paris 
Club of official creditors (which meets under the aegis of the French Treasury). 
The BAC would then recommend to other private creditors that they accept the 
terms agreed upon with the government in question, and most would usually do 
so.
17 Those unwilling to participate (e.g., small regional banks) would generally 
be paid out but with the understanding that they would not be welcome to do 
new business in that country. 
The second route is the unilateral exchange offer, whereby governments 
engage commercial or investment banks to consult privately with a critical mass 
of lenders or investors about the possible shape of an acceptable settlement, 
which is then crafted and presented to all creditors on a take-it-or-leave it basis. 
These exchange offers are often accompanied by exit consents that encourage 
the participation of as many investors as possible by leaving nonparticipants in a 
disadvantageous position—for example, with less liquid securities. This 
approach has become more popular in recent years and was used successfully by 
Pakistan (1999), Ecuador (2000), Ukraine (2000), and Uruguay (2003). In 
recognition that the ideal should not become the enemy of the good, if 
necessary, governments will then quietly pay off any recalcitrant creditors when 
their original claims fall due. 
Argentina has followed neither path. The government appointed a financial 
advisor (Lazard Frères) in early 2003, but charged him solely with the task of 
developing a database of bondholders, presumably to enable them to be 
contacted in the future. Keeping bondholders informed, never mind engaged for 
the sake of a mutually agreeable solution, apparently was not a priority. The 
                                                 
17   See Lex Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery 95–131 (Brookings Inst 
2003) (explaining the London Club process). Chicago Journal of International Law 
  324  Vol. 6 No. 1 
government dropped that firm in early 2004 and retained the services of three 
major investment banks (Barclays Capital, Merrill Lynch, and UBS) to become 
the eventual joint deal managers of its January 2005 debt-restructuring offer. It 
quickly became apparent that these firms would likewise not be engaging in a 
dialogue with the investor base on behalf of the Argentine government.  
The authorities also refused to follow the other, more historical approach 
of encouraging the formation of a bondholders’ committee with which to 
consult and negotiate a debt restructuring. Moreover, the government failed to 
recognize—never mind negotiate with—such a committee, the Global 
Committee of Argentina Bondholders (“GCAB”), once it was formed on the 
initiative of a large portion of disgruntled bondholders residing in Europe, 
Japan, and the United States. From time to time during 2003–04, the 
government held some perfunctory briefings for bondholders, but the outline of 
what would become its debt relief proposal, unveiled in Dubai in September 
2003 (at the joint annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank), was developed 
unilaterally. This proposal, which called for what was estimated to be debt 
forgiveness equivalent to as much as 90 percent of contracted amounts on a net 
present value (“NPV”) basis and which ignored all past due interest, was widely 
denounced by bondholder representatives. The government justified it by 
making reference to a debt sustainability model it had developed that quantified 
ability to pay over a long period on the basis of multiple economic assumptions, 
including the fiscal savings it was willing to generate. The model would never be 
updated to reflect the overperformance of fiscal revenues and other crucial 
economic parameters in 2004, or to incorporate the government’s bulging 
financial assets, both at the National Treasury or at the Central Bank of 
Argentina. Indeed, it would never become part of its prospectus as filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and its counterparts around the world. 
The Dubai proposal served as the basis for the concrete debt restructuring 
proposal put forth, likewise unilaterally, 15 months later (January 2005), which 
was estimated to involve debt relief of about 70 percent on an NPV basis. The 
major improvement made on Argentina’s part was the willingness to backdate to 
December 31, 2003 the new bonds to be issued in exchange for the defaulted 
ones, implicitly recognizing past due interest starting from that date, although 
recalculated at very low rates and capitalized in part. Interest arrears were not 
recognized at all for the preceding twenty-four months (2002–03), whether 
calculated at contractual or lower interest rates. The rest of the improvement 
was delivered exogenously by the financial markets, because an intervening rally 
in high yield and emerging-market bonds greatly narrowed the discount applied 
to similar “junk bonds,” thereby reducing the so-called exit yields used to 
calculate NPVs. 
Specifically, the government proposed that bondholders tender their 
existing 152 bonds, no matter their original maturity date, coupon, or currency From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s Default  Porzecanski 
Summer 2005  325 
denomination, for any of three new securities. The first choice was a limited 
amount of Par bonds payable in dollars, euros, or Argentine pesos, involving no 
“haircut” on principal but a very low interest rate (as little as 1.33 percent on US 
dollar bonds for the first six years, rising to 5.25 percent after 25 years, and 
correspondingly less on euro and peso-denominated bonds, although the latter 
are adjusted for inflation); a long grace period (26 years); and a final maturity in 
2038 (35 years). The second choice was a limited amount of Cuasi-Par bonds, 
issued to those willing to accept a 30.6 percent “haircut” on principal, that are 
payable only in Argentine pesos adjusted for intervening inflation through final 
maturity. They come with a low coupon (3.31 percent) also payable in pesos, a 
very long grace period (33 years), and a final maturity in 2046. And the third 
choice was an unlimited amount of Discount bonds, denominated in dollars, 
euros, or pesos, issued to those accepting a 66.3 percent “haircut” on principal, 
but paying a higher interest rate (part of it capitalized, beginning at 4 percent and 
rising to 8.28 percent on dollar bonds, less on euros and pesos, although the 
latter are adjusted for inflation). They have a long grace period (21 years) and a 
final maturity in 2034. Bondholders were also offered a free option on 
Argentina’s future growth outperformance via a security linked to the country’s 
real GDP, such that economic growth exceeding 3 percent in any one year after 
2014, and somewhat higher between 2006 and 2014, would trigger a small, 
additional interest payment. 
Argentina’s demand for such massive debt relief was without precedent in 
its own checkered financial history. It can only be compared with the relief 
obtained by much poorer countries (for example, Albania in 1995, Bolivia in 
1992, Guyana in 1999, Niger in 1991, and Yemen in 2001), but in these cases the 
sums involved have been far smaller and the creditors involved have been 
commercial bank lenders rather than bondholders. The proposed transaction 
was also unparalleled in various other respects. First, it did not recognize interest 
arrears nor treat them preferentially, as has always been the custom. Second, it 
failed to include an upfront payment to clear a portion of the arrears, a common 
“sweetener” to ensure success. Third, it was not accompanied by the usual 
reassuring endorsement—never mind backed with financial support—from the 
IMF or other multilateral agencies. Fourth, it did not aim for anywhere near 100 
percent participation, which is the traditional objective, nor did it set a high level 
of participation (say, 85 percent or 90 percent) as a required minimum for the 
transaction to proceed.  
In fact, when launching the debt restructuring proposal, Finance Minister 
Roberto Lavagna went so far as to say that the government would regard any 
participation rate above 50 percent as having effectively cured the country’s 
default. The clear implication was that even if nearly half of all bondholders 
failed to accept the terms of the ruinous debt exchange, they would be ignored. 
To ensure the message was heard loud and clear, three weeks into the Chicago Journal of International Law 
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transaction (in early February 2005) the government sent a draft law to the 
legislature forbidding the Executive from reopening the debt exchange in the 
future and engaging in any transaction with bondholders arising from any court 
order or otherwise.
18 The law was passed within one week. 













Per Capita Income ($)*  11,586  3,363  1,826  6,592  3,841  8,280 
Scope ($ Billions)  81.8  6.8  0.6  31.8  3.3  5.4 
Number of Bonds  152  5  3  3  5  65 
Jurisdictions Involved  8  2  1  1  3  6 
Months in Default  38+  10  2  18  3  None 
Minimum Participation Set  No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Recognition of Interest 
Arrears 
Partial Yes Yes Yes  Yes  N/A 
Principal Forgiveness  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  No 
‘Haircut’ on Discount 
Bond (%) 
66.3 40  0 37.5  0  0 
Lowered Coupons  Yes  No   Yes  No   Yes  No 
Extended Maturities  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Participation Rate (% of 
Eligible) 
76 97  95  98  95  93 
Note: N/A stands for not applicable. 
*Adjusted for purchasing power; latest (2003) data for Argentina, otherwise data corresponds to year(s) of 
debt restructuring as noted. 
Source: IIF, IMF, World Bank, author’s calculations. 
III. DEALING WITH A ROGUE DEBTOR 
What is to be done in the case of a sovereign debtor who refuses to honor 
its debt obligations, even though a strong case can be made that it has regained 
the financial wherewithal to do so? In line with experience in decades past, the 
bondholders that within the past couple of years have filed suit against 
Argentina in various jurisdictions have found that seeking remedy in the courts 
against a sovereign is, for the most part, a fruitless endeavor.  
                                                 
18   The law also mandated the government to do everything in its power to delist all bonds not 
tendered into the exchange, and to unilaterally exchange all bonds tied up in litigation against 
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By the close of 2004, nearly 40 individual lawsuits had been filed in New 
York (specifically, before Judge Thomas P. Griesa in the US District Court for 
the Southern District of New York) seeking repayment of Argentina’s 
obligations, and judgments in favor of plaintiffs had been entered in seven cases 
entailing some $740 million. In addition, more than a dozen class action lawsuits 
had been filed against the Argentine government, and one of the plaintiffs had 
been granted the motion to certify its complaint involving two series of bonds 
with a face value of about $3.5 billion. The government, however, represented to 
the court that it had no assets in the United States used for a “commercial 
activity,” such as would provide a legal basis for an attachment or execution 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 
In Italy, there were a half dozen bondholder proceedings against Argentina 
pending in the courts, involving relatively small amounts, and while no final 
decisions had been rendered, some judges ordered payment and ordered the 
freezing of certain assets. However, the Argentine government was challenging 
these actions on the grounds that it enjoys sovereign immunity. In any case, 
under Italian law, any claims against Argentina would only be executable against 
assets not used for “public purposes.” In Germany, by late 2004, more than 100 
legal proceedings had commenced claiming the euro equivalent of less than $100 
million, and several prejudgment “arrest” (attachment) orders had been rendered 
against the Argentine government. Argentina was disputing each payment order 
claiming a “state of necessity,” and although some of the orders were 
enforceable, all cases had been suspended awaiting a decision by the German 
Constitutional Court on whether such a state indeed excused a deferral of debt 
service. 
Dealing with a rogue sovereign debtor requires, in actual practice, the 
political willingness of other sovereign states to confront the errant nation, 
whether directly or through a supranational body such as the IMF. It is only the 
international community that can exercise the kind of diplomatic pressure and 
put forth the financial incentives and disincentives to motivate a rogue sovereign 
debtor to come to terms with its private creditors in a fair and responsible 
manner. It is unfortunate that in the case of Argentina the G-7 governments for 
the most part have not been willing to stand up and be counted.  
To begin with, the international community has been providing a safe 
harbor for Argentina’s hard currency assets. Indeed, a sizeable proportion of the 
government’s and central bank’s foreign exchange holdings reportedly have been 
deposited at the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”), the Basle-based 
central banks’ central bank, where they are out of attachment range. This is 
because the BIS has been granted various immunities in Switzerland and other 
jurisdictions, the main purpose of which, as the BIS itself proudly advertises in Chicago Journal of International Law 
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its website, “is to protect central bank assets held with the BIS from measures of 
compulsory execution and sequestration, and particularly from attachment.”
19 
The welcome mat put out for a rogue sovereign debtor such as Argentina by the 
(exclusively sovereign) shareholders of the BIS thus stands in awkward contrast 
to the contemporary willingness of the international community to trace and 
recover the ill-gotten gains of Third World despots—even when they are on 
deposit in numbered Swiss bank accounts. 
Moreover, the international community has been supportive of Argentina 
via a series of new loans granted by the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank, especially during 2003 and the first half of 2004. 
Indeed, in January 2003, the IMF agreed to extend a loan facility worth almost 
$3 billion to enable the Argentine government to cover debt service payments 
coming due to the Fund and, in September of that year, it opened another such 
window, but this time worth more than $13 billion, to help offset debt service 
payments during 2004–06. Simultaneously, the other multilateral development 
agencies opened up sizeable lines of credit for Argentina, and proceeded to 
disburse funds. All told, the multilateral agencies disbursed to the government of 
Argentina the sums of $600 million in 2002, $10.2 billion in 2003, and $4.1 
billion in the first semester of 2004.
20  
This official financial support has been subject to a variety of conditions 
agreed to by the Argentine government, involving fiscal policy targets and 
structural reforms.
21 Blatant failure to make progress on these reforms eventually 
prompted the IMF to stop disbursing funds in August 2004, whereupon the 
government has nonetheless continued to make debt service payments to the 
Fund. Whatever tough message the IMF’s halt to new lending was intended to 
deliver was blunted, however, by subsequent decisions on the part of the other 
                                                 
19   See BIS as a bank for central banks, available online at <http://www.bis.org/banking/bisbank.htm> 
(visited Mar 26, 2005). In any case, under the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub L No 
94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (1976), codified at 28 USC §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611, 
the property of a foreign central bank held for its own account is immune from attachment or 
execution in the absence of a waiver of immunity. 
20   These disbursements totaling almost $15 billion did not fully offset some $18.7 billion in principal 
payments to the multilateral agencies, never mind interest payments worth $4.2 billion. However, 
prior to 2002, the agencies had already built up a loan exposure in excess of $32 billion to 
Argentina, and the IMF had become the government’s single largest creditor, with $14 billion 
outstanding. 
21   Among the reforms desired was the renegotiation of public utility rates, which for the most part 
remained frozen during 2002–04, causing financial damage to the foreign-owned companies that 
generate and distribute electricity, water, natural gas, and other essential services. By the end of 
2004, these companies had filed about 30 claims before the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), alleging that various government measures 
violated contracts and effectively expropriated their investments without adequate compensation, 
going against the standards set forth in investment treaties to which Argentina is a signatory. From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s Default  Porzecanski 
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multilateral agencies to continue to support Argentina financially. For instance, 
in November 2004, the board of directors of the Inter-American Development 
Bank voted unanimously to approve a multi year, $5 billion package of loans to 
the government; in December, the World Bank approved a $200 million loan for 
the upgrading of infrastructure in Buenos Aires province—in other words, 
business as usual. 
There are grounds for questioning the propriety, never mind the wisdom, 
of this post-default multilateral lending to Argentina. The IMF, in particular, has 
had a policy of lending to a government in default of financial obligations to 
private creditors only when it is pursuing “appropriate policies” and when it is 
making “a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its 
creditors.” Meeting in early September 2002 in the wake of Argentina’s default, 
the board of directors of the IMF reiterated and elaborated on this “good faith 
criterion,” spelling out that governments were expected to “provide creditors 
with an early opportunity to give input on the design of restructuring strategies 
and the design of individual instruments,” and that when a representative 
committee of creditors has been formed, that they would “enter into good faith 
negotiations with this committee.”
22 In its negotiations with the IMF, in fact, the 
Argentine government openly committed to engage in a “collaborative dialogue 
with its creditors” (September 2003) and to begin “meaningful and constructive 
negotiations” with creditor groups, including with GCAB (March 2004). 
However, the government never engaged in any such dialogue or negotiations, 
as detailed in a position paper by GCAB, and the government’s eventual debt 
restructuring proposal did not reflect any input from this large bondholders’ 
group.
23 
Argentina also won an important gesture of political support in the US 
courts—specifically, in the form of amicus curiae briefs filed by none other than 
the US government and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in January 
2004. The Argentine government had sought a declaratory judgment from Judge 
Griesa (of the Southern District of New York) to the effect that several of its 
creditors in pending cases should not be permitted to use a broad interpretation 
of the pari passu clause to enforce their judgments, for instance, by preventing 
the country from making payments to creditors such as the IMF. The plaintiffs 
had countered, among other things, that they had not sought and did not intend 
                                                 
22   IMF, IMF Board Discusses the Good-Faith Criterion under the Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private 
Creditors, Public Information Notice No 02/107 (Sept 24, 2002), available online at 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn02107.htm> (visited Mar 26, 2005). 
23   See Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders (GCAB), The Importance of and the Potential for the 
Expeditious Negotiation of a Consensual and Equitable Restructuring of Argentina’s Defaulted Debt (Aug 3, 
2004), available online at <http://www.gcab.org/images/GCAB_White_Paper_Final.pdf> 
(visited Mar 26, 2005). Chicago Journal of International Law 
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to seek such enforcement action, such that Argentina’s request was premature. 
However, the authorities in Buenos Aires were evidently successful in 
persuading high-ranking US authorities that there was a clear and present danger 
to the international payments system from the potential application of this 
clause, which had been used by creditors against the governments of Peru and 
Nicaragua.
24 In any  event, the plaintiffs prevailed on their procedural argument, 
but there is little doubt that the US and Federal Reserve “statements of interest” 
were interpreted in Buenos Aires as a green light to proceed with a hard line 
stance against bondholders. 
The willingness of US authorities to accommodate Argentina in 2004 
stands in marked contrast to their willingness to confront a defaulting sovereign 
two decades earlier. At the time, Costa Rica had experienced a financial crisis, 
and because of the imposition of exchange controls prohibiting the servicing of 
obligations to foreign creditors, three state-owned banks had defaulted on a 
syndicated loan. A federal district court denied a motion for summary judgment 
against Costa Rica, and on appeal the Second Circuit initially agreed that the suit 
should not be heard on grounds of comity.
25 However, the Justice Department 
submitted an amicus brief explaining that the unilateral imposition of exchange 
controls by Costa Rica was inconsistent with US policy and that the underlying 
obligations to pay remained valid and enforceable. Upon rehearing, the Second 
Circuit reversed itself,
26 opening the door to limited creditor litigation against 
sovereigns and setting a standard that US courts would adhere to throughout the 
1980s and 1990s.
27 
The most recent way that the G-7 governments have winked in Argentina’s 
direction is by failing to insist, either from the start or even late in the game, 
upon overwhelming acceptance of whatever debt restructuring proposal the 
country would put forth to its creditors. That would have put pressure on 
Buenos Aires to come up with a less punishing proposal, or to have added some 
last minute “sweeteners” to maximize bondholder acceptance. The IMF, in 
particular, carefully avoided setting a minimum participation rate it would 
consider acceptable for its own purposes, although privately it had earlier 
signaled that acceptance “in the high 80s” would be desirable. Evidently, its 
major shareholders have wanted to retain the right to recognize a restructuring 
                                                 
24   For an exhaustive background on this clause, authored by two attorneys with the firm that has 
acted as counsel to the governments of Peru, Nicaragua, and Argentina, see Lee C. Buchheit and 
Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 Emory L J 869 (2004). 
25   Allied Bank International v. Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, 733 F2d 23, 27 (2d Cir 1984). 
26   See Allied Bank International v Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, 757 F2d 516, 523 (2d Cir 1985). 
27   See Jill E. Fisch and Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory L J 1043, 1075–88 (2004). From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s Default  Porzecanski 
Summer 2005  331 
that was far less successful than all prior ones, possibly in order to resume the 
Fund’s lending program later this year and keep Argentina from defaulting on its 
obligations to the multilateral agencies. In so doing, however, the G-7 
governments passed up an opportunity to show what Michael Mussa has called 
“principled leadership” in dealing with Argentina.
28 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The case of Argentina suggests that much of the academic and policy 
making literature has ignored the realistic possibility that rogue sovereign 
debtors, rather than rogue private creditors, are the ones that pose the greatest 
threat to the integrity and efficiency of the international financial architecture.  
The country’s actions in the wake of its gigantic default have also exposed 
the limitations of the customary Eurobond offering circulars, brimming as they 
are with legal clauses supposedly spelling out the enforceable rights of investors 
vis-à-vis sovereigns willing to waive their customary immunity. The fact remains 
that it is exceedingly difficult to collect from a sovereign deadbeat. 
The sad truth is that only other governments, rather than even the best 
organized group of bondholders, can hope to rein in a wayward sovereign 
debtor and persuade it not to walk away from its lawful obligations. And yet, as 
has been made clear in various ways, the G-7 governments, and particularly the 
George W. Bush administration, have not been willing to confront the 
authorities in Buenos Aires. 
The very harsh way that Argentina has dealt with its bondholders, despite 
the substantial recovery of its ability to service its contractual obligations, has set 
a troubling precedent for other sovereign debtors in future financial straits. 
While it is unlikely that emerging market governments will want to drive their 
economy into the ground any time soon in order to plead for debt relief on an 
Argentine scale, international financial conditions will not always be as benign as 
they are nowadays. There will surely be global liquidity and economic downturns 
in the future, and some governments will run out of cash. When they do, the 
precedent that Argentina is setting will surely come back to haunt the 
international financial community. 
As concerns the implications of Argentina’s stance for the country’s own 
economic future, chances are that the losses that foreign portfolio and direct 
investors have incurred there will poison the business climate for many years to 
come. This does not mean that the pace of economic activity will grind to a halt. 
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Just like it took many years for the nationalist, populist policies of General Juan 
Domingo Perón to reveal their insidious economic and social downside, it will 
probably take many years for the current, neonationalist, neopopulist policies to 
bear rotten fruit. After all, the tens of billions of dollars that foreign investors 
poured into Argentina during the 1990s did allow for a major modernization of 
the country’s infrastructure and productive base that will not be undone anytime 
soon. 
 